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"It is emphatically the province and duty of the
judicial department to say" who the President is?1
Honorable David H. Coar*
I. INTRODUCTION
I addressed the Loyola University Chicago School of Law's Bush v.
Gore2 conference on February 15, 2002. In my speech, I opined that the
Supreme Court reached the merits in Bush v. Gore because the political
question doctrine is all but comatose in the Supreme Court. I stated that
Bush v. Gore is the latest in a series of cases in which the Supreme
Court has assumed the mantle of supreme interpreter of the
Constitution, unimpaired by structural allocations of responsibility or
prudential concerns about deference to the other branches of
government on issues of interpretation. Since that time, the Columbia
Law Review has published an article entitled More Supreme than
Court? The Fall of the Political Question Doctrine and the Rise of
Judicial Supremacy by Rachel E. Barkow. 3 Barkow's article traces the
history of the political question doctrine and provides an extensive
analysis of the doctrine's applicability to the Article II question in the
2000 presidential election.4  In an effort not to rehash Barkow's
analysis, I will instead explain why I experienced such a visceral
reaction to Bush v. Gore.5  Then, I will briefly set forth the political
question doctrine analysis and explain the way in which the Supreme
1. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (I Cranch) 137, 177 (1803).
* Judge, United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois. The author would
like to thank his law clerk, Katrice L. Bridges, for her assistance in the research and preparation
of this article.
2. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000) (per curiam).
3. Rachel E. Barkow, More Supreme than Court? The Fall of the Political Question Doctrine
and the Rise of Judicial Supremacy, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 237 (2002). Barkow's article examines
the political question doctrine over time, including an extensive analysis of the Article I question
doctrine as part of a larger trend in which the Supreme Court has embraced the view that it alone
among the three branches of government has the power and competency to provide the full
substantive meaning of all constitutional provisions.
4. See id.
5. See infra Part II (discussing the author's personal experience with the election process in
Macon County, Alabama).
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Court has gradually taken away power from the other branches while
simultaneously expanding its own power.
6
II. BACKGROUND
One of the ironies of Bush v. Gore7 is that the opinion is couched in
terms of voting rights. 8 Now, I am a product of my experiences, and it
is difficult for me to view the events of November 2000 as involving
voting rights in the sense that I consider them. I grew up in
Birmingham, Alabama, and attended school there through high school.
My family must have gotten its first television set in the mid-1950s
because I recall watching the presidential conventions in 1956. I also
remember watching the hearings of the United States Civil Rights
Commission on voting rights when the Commission was investigating
why, in Macon County, Alabama, so many African-Americans were
failing the literacy test.
Between college and law school, I spent a year in rural Macon
County, which was the home of the then all black Tuskegee Institute
(now Tuskegee University) and the Tuskegee Veterans' Administration
Hospital. The VA, as it was called, was where the government sent
most of the infirm African-American veterans from the southern and
western states where hospitals, even government hospitals, were still
segregated. Because of the VA and the college, Macon County had one
of the highest concentrations of college-educated African-Americans in
the country. Nonetheless, African-Americans did not have voting roles,
despite the fact that Macon County was overwhelmingly black. How
could that be? The reason: African-American physicians, nurses, and
Ph.D.'s were failing the literacy test.
Today, the notion of literacy tests must seem alien to most people,
but they were a not-so-distant fact of life in portions of this country. 9 I
6. See infra Part III (discussing the Supreme Court's process of limiting the powers of the
other branches of government while expanding its own powers).
7. Bush, 531 U.S. at 104-10 (per curiam) (holding that Florida's recount of ballots in a
presidential election violated equal protection because of its failure to use clear and uniform
standards).
8. See id. at 104-05 (per curiam) (explaining that the right to vote is fundamental in that equal
weight must be accorded to each vote and formulating the issue in the case as "whether the
recount procedures the Florida Supreme Court has adopted are consistent with its obligation to
avoid arbitrary and disparate treatment of members of the electorate").
9. In South Carolina v. Katzenbach, the Supreme Court explained that, beginning in 1890, the
states of Alabama, Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, North Carolina, South Carolina, and Virginia
enacted tests that were specifically designed to prevent African-Americans from voting. South
Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 310 (1966). The tests typically made the ability to read
and write a registration qualification, in addition to the required completion of a registration form.
Id. at 310-11. "These laws were based on the fact that as of 1890 in each of the named States,
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graduated from college in 1964, just months before my twenty-first
birthday and the 1964 presidential election. When I went to register to
vote, I learned that I had to take a literacy test. Registration required
about ten minutes of completing forms, and then I was brought to a desk
and seated across from a deputy registrar. On his desk was a large
rolodex-like contraption, but instead of contact information, each card
on the wheel had a passage from the United States Constitution. When
I was seated, the deputy registrar selected a card, told me to read the
passage, and then directed me to write on a piece of paper what the
passage meant. Back then, I considered myself as knowledgeable about
the Constitution as any non-lawyer could be, but it was not until I got to
law school that I ever read the Constitution from beginning to end. The
passage that was assigned was some obscure provision that I do not
remember, but I explained it as best I could. The procedure was that
you would be notified by mail as to whether you were registered or not.
That evening at dinner, my father asked if I had gone down to register,
and I said yes. He then asked whether I passed the literacy portion, and
I answered truthfully that I was not sure. He gave me a look that would
have melted steel and said, "I'm in debt up to my eyeballs to pay for
your college education, and you don't know whether you're literate?" I
did in fact pass the literacy test and was able to vote in the 1964
presidential election.
I recounted my personal experience with voting in order to show that
voting and the right to vote are very important to me, not as an abstract
political principle but rather as a real, concrete incident of citizenship
and freedom. Indeed, I am not alone in assigning such value to the right
to vote. For instance, before starting law school, I worked for a year in
rural Alabama. While there, I saw a huge tent city in Lowndes County
that housed people who had been evicted from their sharecroppers'
shacks because they had the temerity to attempt to register to vote.
Hence, it is with that baggage that I followed the events leading up to
the Supreme Court's decision in Bush v. Gore.1
0
more than two-thirds of the adult Negroes were illiterate while less than one-quarter of the adult
whites were unable to read or write." Id. at 311. All of the named states, however, had alternate
tests to assure that white illiterates would not be deprived of their right to vote. Id. For example,
"[tihese [alternate tests] included grandfather clauses, property qualifications, 'good character'
tests, and the requirement that registrants 'understand' or 'interpret' certain matter." Id.
10. It is also because of that baggage that I read the Supreme Court opinion in disbelief. In
the past, the Supreme Court has stated that all "qualified voters" have a constitutionally protected
right to vote, Ex parte Yarbrough, 110 U.S. 651, 665-66 (1884), as well as the right to have their
votes counted, Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 554 (1964) (citing United States v. Mosley, 238
U.S. 383, 386 (1915)). In Harper v. Virginia State Board of Elections, the Supreme Court stated,
"Once the franchise is granted to the electorate, lines may not be drawn that are inconsistent with
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III. BUSH V. GORE: THE POLITICAL QUESTION
Like millions of our fellow Americans, I watched television on
election night 2000 with rapt attention. My spirits rose and fell with
every erroneous prediction of the network mystics. Never in my wildest
dreams, however, had I expected to live through a presidential election
that would go down to the wire based upon a few votes in a single state.
Over the next few days, as the blue suits descended on Florida,
strategies developed and unraveled as papers were filed in what seemed
like dozens of courts at the same time, and we were voyeurs again. We
all listened to talk about chads and electors, Article II, Section 1, Clause
2, equal protection, and due process with the same obsessiveness with
which we had watched infrared lighted, laser guided bombs descend to
their targets in eerie slow motion during the Gulf War. By the time the
focus shifted from Florida to the United States Supreme Court, we
could identify the justices of the Florida Supreme Court by sight and
political affiliation, if not by name. And when all of the dust had
settled, life as we knew it returned to normal; the sun rose and set, the
children went to school and played, the lawyers went home, and a
president took office. We are now gathered a year later to try to sort out
what it all meant.
After the excitement of the election and the drama surrounding the
events in Florida have died down, I doubt that history will much care
about who won the 2000 presidential election. It occurred to me,
however, that the manner in which the election was decided may have
long-term significance. Bush v. Gore shed light on how the pieces of
the government fit together, and that is what I would like to explore.
the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment." Harper v. Va. State Bd. of
Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 665 (1966). In Bush v. Gore, the Supreme Court, for the first time,
called into question the substantive standard by which a state determines whether a vote was
legally cast. Bush, 531 U.S. at 105 (per curiam). The Court found an equal protection violation
as a result of the various counties' methods of interpreting the "intent of the voter" standard. Id.
at 106-07 (per curiam). According to the Court, the lack of standards to ensure equal application
of the "intent of the voter" standard led to the arbitrary and disparate treatment of members of the
electorate. Id. at 109 (per curiam). But which members of the electorate? Past equal protection
cases required arbitrary or disparate treatment that disenfranchised or diluted the voting strength
of a class of voters like a racial minority. See, e.g., Harmon v. Forssenius, 380 U.S. 528, 533-34,
543 (1965) (holding unconstitutional a poll tax that "was born of a desire to disenfranchise" a
racial minority). Bush v. Gore, unlike traditional equal protection cases, focused on the disparity
in the manual recount rather than the voter's opportunity to cast a ballot that is counted. See
Pamela S. Karlan, Nothing Personal: The Evolution of the Newest Equal Protection from Shaw v.
Reno to Bush v. Gore, 79 N.C. L. REv. 1345, 1364-66 (2001) (explaining that the Supreme Court
ignored the fact that systems that disproportionately reject votes, like punch cards, have a racially
disparate impact and are most often found where minority voters are concentrated).
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The powers of the federal government are divided among the three
branches, where each has its own constitutionally created duties. It
should come as no surprise that the various branches sometimes
disagree as to what the Constitution means. So, one of the earliest
questions that the parents of our nation had to consider was whether any
particular branch's interpretation of the Constitution was entitled to
greater weight than the others. Marbury v. Madison II resolved the
question, to some extent, by affirming the concept of judicial review
and declaring that "[i]t is emphatically the province and duty of the
judicial department to say what the law is."' 12 Nothing in the judicial
review doctrine, however, inherently gives the federal courts the right to
trump the constitutional interpretations in every area. 13 Judicial review
applies only 4 in the court's sphere of authority: cases and
controversies.1  Those words are words of art in constitutional
parlance. Not every complaint that lands on the desk of the intake clerk
meets the definition of case or controversy. Some matters are not
"justiciable" because they are not ripe, they are moot, the party bringing
the action lacks standing, an opinion on the issue would be merely
advisory, or the matter involves a political question. 15 None of those
terms are written in the Constitution, but the limitations on the power of
the courts that they compel are implicit in the structure of the document.
I would like to focus on the political question doctrine. Although the
political question doctrine did not originate with the Supreme Court's
decision in Baker v. Carr,16 it contains the most often quoted
formulation of the doctrine. In Baker, the Supreme Court described the
doctrine as follows:
11. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
12. Id. at 177. In Marbury v. Madison, the Supreme Court explained that an act of the United
States Congress that is repugnant to the Constitution cannot become a law. Id. at 180. The
constitutional basis for Supreme Court review of state court decisions was later established in
Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 404 (1821), and Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S.
(I Wheat.) 304, 333-34 (1816).
13. Even in Marbury the Supreme Court recognized limits to its power of judicial review. The
Court explained that where heads of departments are political and confidential agents of
executives, their acts in cases in which the executive possesses a constitutional or legal discretion
are only politically examinable. Id. at 166.
14. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1. The case and controversy requirement arises from the
limits imposed on federal jurisdiction in Article III, Section 2 of the Constitution. Id.
15. See ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 46-49
(Richard A. Epstein et al. eds., 1997). Chemerinsky explains that the justiciability doctrines help
conserve the balance between judicial restraint and the need for review. The policies underlying
the justiciability requirements include (1) separation of powers, (2) conservation of judicial
resources, and (3) improving judicial decision-making by providing the federal courts with
concrete controversies best suited for judicial review. Id.
16. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 210 (1961).
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Prominent on the surface of any case held to involve a political
question is found a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment
of the issue to a coordinate political department; or a lack of judicially
discoverable and manageable standards for resolving it; or the
impossibility of deciding without an initial policy determination of a
kind clearly for nonjudicial discretion; or the impossibility of a court's
undertaking independent resolution without expressing lack of the
respect due coordinate branches of government; or an unusual need for
unquestioning adherence to a political decision already made; or the
potentiality of embarrassment from multifarious pronouncements by
various departments on one question. 17
Now, let me set the stage for why I believe that Bush v. Gore
involved a political question. After the polls closed on election night,
election officials in Florida began to count the votes. Some interested
citizens of Florida believed that their votes for President were not
counted when they should have been, while others believed that votes
were counted that should not have been. 18 Partisans representing the
two major candidates were confident that if there were a recount
applying their view of the standards for determining the validity of
ballots, the outcome would favor the candidate of their party.
19
Conversely, if the standards urged by the other party prevailed, the
outcome would likely be different.20 In the early morning on the day
after Election Day, it was unclear whether anyone had really focused on
the Electoral College and how that might add another level of
complexity. It did not take long, however, for the obscure provisions of
Article II, Section 1 of the Constitution to surface as important factors.
21
Nor did it take long for the lawsuits to begin. As we all know, the
ultimate issues found their way to the United States Supreme Court by
way of the Florida Supreme Court.
22
17. Id. at 217.
18. See David H. Hackworth, Editorial, Don't Trash Votes of Our Soldiers, SUN-SENTINEL (S.
Fla.), Nov. 30, 2000, at 29A, available at 2000 WL 28993644; Shana Gruskin, Gore Gains 188
Votes in Recount, SUN-SENTINEL (S. Fla.), Nov. 30, 2000, at IA, available at 2000 WL
28993775.
19. See And the Winner Is? Presidential Winner Hinges on Outcome of Florida Recount,
CHARLESTON GAZETrE (W.V.), Nov. 8, 2000, at IA, available at 2000 WL 2635630 [hereinafter
And the Winner Is?]; Joel Engelhardt et al., Next Stop for Ballots: Tallahassee Counting Is Over,
Unless Judge Orders Still Another One, PALM BEACH POST, Nov. 30, 2000, at IA, available at
2000 WL 29545719.
20. See And the Winner Is?, supra note 19; Engelhardt et al., supra note 19.
21. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1.
22. See Gore v. Harris, 772 So. 2d 1243, 1262 (Fla.) (per curiam), rev'd per curiam sub nom.
Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000).
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Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction, so the first thing that
a federal court must determine is its jurisdictional basis for the case
before it.23 If a dispute involves a political question, there is no "case or
controversy" and, therefore, no jurisdiction. 24  So, the threshold
question that the Supreme Court had to decide was whether it had
jurisdiction. No one raised the political question issue. But we all
know that the Court had an obligation to determine its jurisdiction,
whether or not a party raised the issue. However, what did the Supreme
Court say? Nothing!
Was this a political question? Remember that the first factor in the
formulation from Baker v. Carr is "a textually demonstrable
constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate political
department. ' 25 Article II, Section 1 provides, in relevant part: "Each
state shall appoint, in such Manner as the Legislature thereof may
direct, a Number of Electors... .";26 and Amendment XII provides in
pertinent part:
The Electors shall meet in their respective states and vote by ballot for
President and Vice President ... and they shall make distinct lists of
all persons voted for. .. which lists they shall sign and certify, and
transmit sealed to the seat of the government of the United States,
directed to the President of the Senate ... [who] shall, in the presence
of the Senate and House of Representatives, open all the certificates
and the votes shall then be counted; the person having the greatest
number of votes for President, shall be the President, if such number
be a majority of the whole number of Electors appointed; and if no
person have such majority, then from the persons having the highest
numbers not exceeding three on the list of those voted for as President,
the House of Representatives shall choose immediately, by ballot, the
President. 2
7
This language commits to the states and Congress, to the exclusion of
the courts, the power to administer the Electoral College.
Obviously, Congress held the same belief because the United States
Code sets forth a detailed procedure for how the votes of the electors are
counted and registered in the joint session of Congress referred to in
Amendment XII, including a very elaborate procedure for receiving and
resolving objections to the state certified electors. 2 8  Under the
23. See U.S. CONST. art. 1II, § 2, cl. 1.
24. See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1961).
25. Id. at 217; see also supra note 17 and accompanying text (quoting the political question
doctrine as set forth in Baker).
26. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 2.
27. U.S. CONST. amend. XII.
28. See 3 U.S.C. § 15 (2000).
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procedure, each House separately considers and resolves objections. 29
If the supporters of Bush or Gore objected to the slate of electors
certified by Florida officials, they had to resort to the processes set forth
in the Constitution and the statute.
The political question doctrine is not only about a textually
demonstrable commitment to another branch of government, it is also
about "respect due coordinate branches of government." 3°  The
Supreme Court, however, showed a complete lack of respect for
Florida's and Congress's ability to resolve the issue when it intervened
in an area in which it lacked jurisdiction. Separation of powers and
federalism required resolution of the presidential election of 2000 by the
political process, not by a politically unaccountable branch of
government. This is not the first time, however, that the Supreme Court
has trampled on Congress's duties in an effort to increase its own
power. For instance, in cases such as City of Boerne v. Flores,31 United
States v. Lopez,3 2 and United States v. Morrison,33 the Supreme Court
found acts passed by Congress unconstitutional because they exceeded
the scope of Congress's authority. The Boerne Court paid mere lip
service to the notions that "[w]hen Congress acts within its sphere of
power and responsibilities, it has not just the right but the duty to make
29. See id.
30. Baker, 369 U.S. at 217; see also supra note 17 and accompanying text (quoting the
political question doctrine as set forth in Baker).
31. City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 536 (1997). In Boerne, the Supreme Court found
the Religious Freedom Restoration Act ("RFRA") unconstitutional because it exceeded the scope
of Congress's enforcement power under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. RFRA was
enacted in direct response to Employment Division, Department of Human Resources v. Smith, in
which the Supreme Court upheld, against a free exercise challenge, a state law of general
applicability criminalizing peyote use, as applied to deny unemployment benefits to Native
American Church members who lost their jobs because of such use. See Employment Div., Dep't
of Human Res. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 890 (1990). RFRA required the state to show a
compelling government interest for a law if it substantially burdens an individual's exercise of
religion. Boerne, 521 U.S. at 533-34. In Boerne, the Supreme Court found that Congress's
Section 5 power was remedial, not substantive, and that because there were no findings of
generally applicable laws passed as a result of religious bigotry in the past forty years, RFRA was
not remedial. Id. at 531-32. The effect was to show little deference to Congress's determination,
even where no individual claimed that the statute under review burdened his or her rights.
32. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 568 (1995). In Lopez, the Supreme Court held the
Gun-Free School Zones Act of 1990, which made it a federal crime to knowingly possess a
firearm in a school zone, unconstitutional because it exceeded the scope of Congress's authority
under the Commerce Clause. Id. at 561-62.
33. United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 627 (2000). In Morrison, the Supreme Court
found the Violence Against Women Act ("VAWA") unconstitutional because Congress exceeded
the scope of its authority under both Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment and the Commerce
Clause. Id. at 615-19. The VAWA provided a federal civil remedy for the victims of gender-
motivated violence. Id. at 601-02.
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its own informed judgment on the meaning and force of the
Constitution" and that "the Constitution is preserved best when each
part of the government respects both the Constitution and the proper
actions and determinations of other branches." 34  In Boerne, the
Supreme Court found Congress's power under Section 5 of the
Fourteenth Amendment to be remedial, not substantive.3 5  Thus,
according to the Court, Congress may use its Section 5 enforcement
powers only in areas where the Court has previously found a
constitutional violation.36 The Court reasoned that the design and text
of Section 5 are "inconsistent" with the idea that Congress has the
power to determine the substance of the Fourteenth Amendment's
restrictions on the states.
37
In Lopez and Morrison, the Supreme Court found that Congress
exceeded its authority under the Commerce Clause.3 8 The Court stated
that the mere fact that Congress may conclude that a particular activity
substantially affects interstate commerce does not make it so, even
when supported by factual findings.39  Instead, "whether particular
operations affect interstate commerce sufficiently to come under the
constitutional power of Congress to regulate them is ultimately a
judicial rather than a legislative question, and can be settled finally only
by this Court."
40
Now, in Bush v. Gore, rather than discrediting Congress's ability to
make constitutional determinations by finding a congressional act
unconstitutional, the Court completely usurped Congress's duty as set
forth in Article II, Section 1.4 1 While it is beyond question that within
its sphere, it is the duty of the Supreme Court to determine the
constitutionality of laws passed by Congress, the Supreme Court is not
34. Boerne, 521 U.S. at 535-36.
35. Id. at 519-20. The Fourteenth Amendment prohibits the states from making or enforcing
any laws that deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law, or that
deny any person within their jurisdictions the equal protection of their laws. Id. at 516-17. The
enforcement provision, Section 5, provides, in relevant part: "The Congress shall have power to
enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5.
36. Boerne, 521 U.S. at 519.
37. Id.
38. Morrison, 529 U.S. at 627; United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 568 (1995).
39. Morrison, 529 U.S. at 614 (quoting Lopez, 514 U.S. at 557 n.2). In Morrison, as opposed
to Lopez, Congress made numerous findings regarding the serious impact that gender-motivated
violence has on victims and their families. Id. at 614. In Lopez, the lack of congressional
findings linking the prohibited activity to interstate commerce was one of the factors the Court
used to find the Gun-Free School Zones Act of 1990 unconstitutional. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 557.
40. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 557 n.2 (quoting Heart of Atlanta Motel v. United States, 379 U.S. 241,
273 (1964)).
41. See Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 104 (2000) (per curiam).
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the only branch of government entrusted with the power to interpret the
Constitution. The Court was far beyond the command of Marbury v.
Madison.4 2 In Marbury, the Supreme Court spoke of its duty in terms
of cases where a legislative act and the Constitution both apply: "[T]he
courts are to regard the constitution; and the constitution is superior to
any ordinary act of the legislature; the constitution, and not such
ordinary act, must govern the case to which they both apply. ' '43 The
Constitution must also govern when it expressly entrusts a duty to
Congress and the states, to the exclusion of the courts. Unless, of
course, "[i]t is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial
department to say" 44 who the President is.
42. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 180 (1803); see also supra notes 12-15
and accompanying text (discussing the command of Marbury v. Madison).
43. Marbury, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 178.
44. Id. at 177.
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